Notwithstanding a possible ceasefire that sees Israeli hostages released by Hamas, the Israeli government will not rest until it has eliminated those it deems responsible for the Oct. 7 attacks.
The visceral sadistic and sexual brutality of those attacks and the psychological-physical damage they caused to Israel’s security architecture are defining for Israel. Whether it takes one year or 20 years, Israel will be determined to kill all those involved. History offers an important lesson.
Oct. 16, 1972: Wael Zwaiter was shot dead in his Rome apartment building.
April 6, 1973: Basil al Kubaisi was shot dead on a Paris street.
June 9, 1986: Khaled Nazzal was shot dead on an Athens street.
Oct. 26, 1995: Fathi Shaqaqi was shot dead while shopping in Malta.
Jan. 19, 2010: Mahmoud al Mabhouh suffocated in a Dubai hotel room.
July 23, 2011: Darioush Rezaeinejad was shot dead on a Tehran street.
Nov. 27, 2020: Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was shot dead while his motorcade traveled to Tehran.
These are just a few of the assassinations that Israel has carried out against Palestinian terrorists over the years. However, the diversity in time and space of these killings underlines a key point. Namely, Israel’s enduring capacity to act patiently, aggressively, and globally in hunting down its enemies.
Israel’s Mossad foreign intelligence service will be the centerpiece of what is to come. Mossad relies heavily on forged passports and the replication of foreign passports belonging to Israelis who hold dual citizenship with other nations. This allows Mossad operatives relative freedom of movement across the world. Those responsible for planning or conducting the Oct. 7 attacks should thus be wary of motorcycles. That vehicle, after all, has become Mossad’s trademark means of rapidly approaching a target, shooting, and then scooting off.
The patient generation of access to a target country or person is another Mossad trademark. Mossad’s networks allow it to identify, track, and eliminate targets even in a highly restrictive security environment such as that of Iran. Mossad’s compartmentation of planners, facilitators, and operatives has further obstructed Iranian counterintelligence from combating its activities. In turn, Mossad has earned access to highly protected interests, the Iranian nuclear program and its scientific corps, for example.
But there’s another reason Hamas leaders and fundraisers in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America would be delusional to perceive safety abroad. Mossad’s Caesarea special activities unit is renowned for its penchant for focused aggression and its reluctance to be bound by Mossad’s bureaucracy. And Mossad’s risk tolerance extends to the operational and political levels. Israel has shown a sustained willingness to risk and, if necessary, accept significant political fallout from its conduct of unilateral operations, even on the soil of close allies. This is why, for example, the FBI regards Mossad as a top counterintelligence threat on U.S. soil. The others on that list are China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and, to a lesser degree, France (France’s DGSE intelligence service likes to steal foreign intellectual property).
The importance of the intersection of Mossad’s operational culture and Israel’s post-Oct. 7 diminished sense of security cannot be understated. U.S. and British intelligence officers view their Mossad counterparts as particularly single-minded, placing far less emphasis on allied cooperation for allied cooperation’s sake. Instead, Mossad is perceived as being willing to do whatever it believes it should do at any one moment to advance Israeli interests. Even where that activity is detrimental to the interests of its allies. This will be particularly relevant in terms of Mossad’s response to the Oct. 7 attacks.
And it will be true whoever replaces Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu if he leaves power in the coming months. Unlike the Russian intelligence services, Mossad cares far more about effects than theatrics. It will thus prefer to hit people with cars, push people in front of cars, or induce heart attacks when targeting Hamas operatives in nations where shootings might attract international controversy. But it won’t hold back just because someone is staying at a five-star hotel in Vienna, Brussels, or Paris.
Top line: Mossad will view the coming assassinations as legitimate and necessary means of protecting the Israeli state and the Jewish people. The legacy of the Holocaust looms large here. After 11 Israeli athletes were killed at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Mossad waged a long global campaign to eliminate those who authorized, facilitated, and carried out that attack. Nearly 100 times more Israelis were killed on Oct. 7.
Put another way, Ismail Haniyeh and a number of others have a problem.
